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A mode] of labow ~upply ie formulated in which individnal lsbow force par-
ticipante are ae~umed to be reetricted in their choice by the job offers which arrive
randomly from a job offer di~tríbution. A job offer coasiets of a wage component
and aa houn component. The number of job~ offeted to an individual i~ random
and individuaL will chooae the wage-hours paekage which generate~ the higheat
utility level.
The model ie to provide a link between ~tstic modele oflabow aupply in which
individusl~ are ~ubject to howe re~trictione and in which no allowance ie made for
an independent wage offer effect, and dynsmic modeL ftom job ~earch theory in
which the wage rate ia aseumed to be the only job component, thereby implicitly
areuming that individuals are not faced by howi reatrictioni.
1The sathot ehank~ the Organisstie voor Strategi~ch Arbeid~marktondenoek (OSA) for kindly pro-
viding the data. Thank~ are dae to Arthnr vw Soe~t, Marcel Kerkhofi and Arie Kapteyn.1
1 Introduction
In this paper a rnodel of labour supply is set up in which individuala are restricted
in their choice by the job offers that are offered to them by the employers. In the mid-
eighties it was recognized that the standard neo-classical labour supply model (see e.g.
Heckman (1974), Hausman (1980)), in which wages are fixed and the optimal number
of working hours can always be chosen was not in accordance with reality. Dickens and
Lundberg (1985) introduced hours restrictions into the labour supply model assuming
that hours arrive from a discrete offer distribution. Tummers and Woittiez (1991) ex-
tended the mode) by making the wage rate dependent on hours. Van Scest, Woittiez
and Kapteyn (1990) compared the atandard model with the model with houra restric-
tions using a Dutch data set on labour supply, taking into account the tax system, and
their estimation results are relevant empirical evidence in favour of the hours r~estric-
tions model. In Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1987) a different approach to reatrictions
on the labour market is followed. Here the emphasis is on the modelling of involuntary
unemployment.
Although wages can vary with the number of hours offered in these models, for ex-
ample because individuals base theit decisions on net wages, the possibility that wages
also vary from job offer to job offer because of an independent wage offer effect is not
taken into consideration. We will assume that, like in job search theory (see Mortensen
(1986) for an overview), wages arrive from a wage offer distribution.
We thus make the assumption that a job offer consists of two characteristics. It has
a wage componetrt and an hours component. An individual wil] choose the job yielding
tirc highest utility level. If all jobs offered generate utility levels less than the utility of
not working the individual is observed to be non-working. The possibility is left open
that an individual wil! receive no job offer at all, so involuntary unemployment may
arise. Only wage-hours offera that are accepted will be observed. The distribution of the
observed wages will depend on the structure of the model and therefore it is not possible
to usc a two-step procedure to estimate the labour supply parameters, estimating the
parameters oí the wage ditribution separate.ly. All parameters of the model have to be
estimated simultaneouslv.
As opposed to previous studies, like Tummers and Woittiez (1991) and Van Soest,
Woittiez and Kapteyn (1990), the distribution of the number of job offers is made de-
pendent on individual characteriatics. It is tested for the significance of the dependence
of the average number of job offers on individual characteristics. Particular attention is
paid to the effects on the parameter estimates of the utility function, as the introduction
of an individual specific number of job offers turns out to have serious consequences for
these estimates.
The model is estimated both wit}r and without hours dependence of the wage equation,
which enables us to test for the significance of hours in the wage equation. The estimates
of the specification with hours in the wage equation provide a different explanation for
observing low freyuencies of werkly working hours than specifications without hours
dependent wages.
Simulation experiments are performed to compare the empirical frequency distribu-
tion of working hours with the frequency distribution that is generated by the model.2
Moreover, it is tested formally whether the simulated hours distribution and the empir-
ical hours distribution are equal.
In section 2 we present the model and formulate the likelihood function. In section
3 the maximum likelihood estimates of various model specifications are presented. Sim-
ulation experiments and formal testing procedures are períormed. Finally, in section 4,
some concluding remarks are made.
2 The model
"I'h~~ inud~~l :axsunu~s 1,6at. Lho iudividual caonot snpply the optimal nnmbcr of working
óuurs whicb results from maximizing utility subject to a budget cunstraint, like in the
stanclard labour aupply model, in which typically no involuntary unemployment can
occur, see e.g. Heckman (1974) and Hausman (1980). Instead, it ia assumed that the
individual, at a given point in time, receives a random amount of job offers from the
employers. A job offer is characterized by a wage rate and a weekly number of working
hours. The job offers are compared to each other by their utility level. The individual
selects the job with the highest utility level, which is compared with the utility level of
not working, after which it is decided whether or not the job is accepted. Note that the
model is fully static in the sense that all job offers arrive at a given point in time and the
job acceptance decision is made immediately, without taking into account the possibility
of future job offers. Therefore, the model can be estimated with cross section data. In
Blcemen (1992) a sequential job search model is presented in which a job not only has
a wage component, as is usual in the standard job search model, see e.g. Mortensen
(1986), but has an hours component as well, as in the (static) Dickens and Lundberg
(1985) model. In this sequential search model, apart from data on labour supply and
the wage rate, use is made of duration data in the estimation of the model, so the
availability of a panel survey is a cequirement. In making the job acceptance decision
the expectations with respect to possible future job offers are taken into acount as well.
The present model provides a link between the static Dickens and Lundberg (1985)
model, in wlrich only the number of working hours varies from job offer to job offer, and
the standard job search model in which the wage rate is the only job component.
The number of job offers is assumed to be Poisson distributed with parameter a. An
advantage of this specification, a.9 opposed to the binomial specification of Tummers and
Woittiez (1991) and Van Soest et al. (1990), is that it can easily be made dependent on
individual characteristics. In these previous studies, the effect of individual characteris-
tics, like age and the level of education, on the number of job offers, have typically been
ignored. Mureover, in the binomial distribution a fixed maximum number of job offers
has to be chosen in advance.
A job offer is modelled as a simultaneous draw of a wage rate w and a weekly number
of working hours h from a joint wage hours offer distribution j(w, h).
As in the Dickens and Lundberg (1985) approach we assume that there is a discrete
hours olíer distribution defined over rn fixed numbers of positive houra h7,! - 1,...,m.
That is, hours are grouped into m categories, where the probability of drawing from
category ! is given by pi. The advantage of this approach is that no heavy restrictions,3
like single peakedness or symmetry, are placed on the shape of the distribution. The
price which has to be paid for this aexibility of the shape of the houra distribution is
that labour supply can only take a discrete number of values.
PÍh - hr) - Pr,l- 1, ..., m (2.1)
In the estimation the probabilities can be parametrized as
Frr
Pr - m , hl - 1 (2.2)
~k-1 Ílk
in which pr has been normalized to 1 and the remaining pr are nonnegative.
The wage rate, conditional on h- hr, is assumed to be lognormally distributed. Tum-
mers and Woittiez (1991) also estimated the wage diatribution jointly with the labour
suppl,y probabilities, but they use a normal wage distribution, thereby not reatricting
the range of possible wages to positive values. The wage specification becomes
]n w - x~q .} v (2.3)
v ~ N(O,ou) (2.4)
or equivalently
w- exp(xjrj)u with u- exp(v) (2.5)
in which the subindex ( indicates possible dependence on hr. The job joint job offer
density function becomes
f(w, hr) - 1 1 exp (- 1[ln w - rjxr]~1
Pt, 0 G w G oo, !- 1, ..., m (2.6)
2aw l 2av
For ease of exposition it is assumed for the moment that the budget constraint is
línear, ignoring the tax system.
y-whfp (2.7)
where ~e is non-labour income.
`The utility function is defined over labour supply h and income y and is indicated
by u(h, y). The specification of the utility function is the Hausman (1980) specification.
Maximizing this ut.ility function subject to a linear budget constraint yields a labour
supply function which is linear in both non-labour income and the wage rate.




a~, y, b are parameters, Q G 0, ry 1 0
~ y is disposable income
~ h is the number of working hours
~ c is an unobserved randorn taste variable, e~ N(0, o~)4
~ a is a vector o( individual charactcristics
At a given point in time, an individual receives n job offers each of them conaisting of
a wage w, 0 C i~ C oo and a number of working hours h E{h~, ..., hm}. Furthermore, an
individual can always choose not to work. The alternative which yielde the highest level
of utility will be chosen. An individual will be observed to be non-working if the utility
level of not working exceeds the utility level of all of the n job offers. The number ofjob
offers is assumed to be a Poisson distributed random variable.
n t , n- 0,1, ..., oo (2.9) p( ) - eXp(-~)An n.
Noto LhaL it is possible that no jobs are offered at all so that individuals can be involun-
t.arily uncmpluycd.
In order to write down the likelihood function the likelihood contribution of non-
working and working individuals will be determined separately. Suppose that for a
working individual we observe the wage-houra pair (w„h~,), where l, E{1,...,m}. The
fact that (ur„ ht,) is observed means that all other job offers, if there are any, are from
the set of wage-houra packages which yield at most the same utility level as the observed
pair. This set has to be determined. For every level ofhours ht,! - 1, ..., m, the set A~(e)
of wages can be determined which includes all wage levels w for which u(ht, wh! ~ p) G
u(hi,, w,hr, t p) for a given value of e.
A~(e) :- {w~u(hi, whr ~ p) C u(h~,, w,ht, f p)~e} (2.10)
Thc probability N(TU„h~,~c) of drawing an arbitrary job o(fcr which yiclds at rnosL the
sarne utilit.y levcl as thc obsc:rved job (w„ h~,) equala the probability of drawing a job
ofícr from any of the sets A~(e), i.e.
m
P(w.,ht.~e) :- P(u(h,wh f Ir) C u(hi.,w.ht. f P)~e) -~Prp(w E Ar(e)~e) (2.11)
t-r
Using the distributional assumptions in (2.3) and (2.4) yields
P(w E At(e)~e) - ~~tne~(o-n'zj) if gr(e) 1 0 (`2.12)
- 0 if g~(e) C 0 (2.13)
wil.h N(.) t.hc st.xndarcl uunual distributiun fruutiou and
yi(c) -
A~In ~hr(7 - Rhi.) 7- Qhi. hi
(7 -~hi) ]n l,- ~yi~ -(hi. - hi)(7 - QXó - Qe - f1~N) } 7- Qhi hi.
w. 2.14 - ( )
Note that if I-!' the firat two terms of (2.14) are equal to zero, whereas the last term
becomes w'.
Now assume that there are n job offers (w~~l, h~~l), j- 1, ..., n. Only the job with the
highest utility level, (w.,hi,) is observed if its utility level is higher than uo - u(0,p),5
the utility level of not working which we will call the reservation utility Ievel. So
(rv., ht.) -(tllli)~ h(~)) if u(h(r), w(i)h(i) f Ir) ~
and u(h(r), w(r)hp) f {r) ~
(w.,h~.) - (w(z),h(2)) if u(A(s),w(s)h(s) f l~) ~
and u(A(z),w(z)h(~) ~ p) ~
(w.,ht.) - (w(n),h(n)) if u(h(n),w(n)h(n) f p) ~
ancl u(h(„), w(n)h(n) f i~) ~
u(h(i)~ w(i)h(i) f í~)
J - 2,...,n
uo
u(h(i)~ w(i)h(i) f !~)






The observed job is the result of any of theae n poseibilitiea and therefore, the likelihood
contribution of the observed job equals n times the probability that there are n- 1
job offere with a utility level that does not exceed the utility level of the obaerved job,
times the wage offer density function evaluated in the observed wage rate w., times
the probability pt, of drawing the observed number of working hours ht,. The likelihood
contribution of an observed wage-houra pair, conditional on e and the number of drawings
n, becomea:
l(w., ht. [e, n) - n[P{w., ht. ~e)[n-rk(w., n~x, Q~)p~. l. E{1, .., m}
u(h~.,w.h~. f F~) ~ uo
(2.16)
where k(.) is thc log-normal density function of wageoffers. Note that ií n equala zero the
likelihood contribution of the observed value is zero, as observing a job ia in contradiction
with the occnrrence of zero job offers. I[ n- 1, there is no choice among different joba
and thc liki~lihixid contribution o( obscrviug (ur., ht,) bccomcz~ jurd thc job oll'er denaity
evaluated in the observed job.
(2.16) is multiplied by the probability that n occurs, after which we sum ovea all n
to obtain the likelihood contribution of the observed wage-hours package, conditional on
the unobserved preference parameter e:
f(w.,ht.~e) - aexp{-~[I - P(w.,hr.~e)[}k(w.,n~x,av)Pi. f. E{1,...,m}
u(ht.,w.ht. f Ir) ~ uo
(2.17)
For an individual who is not working none of the n job offers generates a utility leve.l
which i~xceecls the utility Ievel o[ uot working, where we Itave to take into account that
n actually may be zero. Then the probability that none of the n job offera is acceptable
is given by
P{h - ~Ie, n) - [P(~~e)~n (2.18)
where
m
P(O~e) - ~ ptP(w E Ato(e)~e) (2.19)
t-r6
where Aio(e) is defined as in (2.10), with h~, replaced by zero and g~(e) in (2.12) and
(2.13)is replaced by g~o(e), which is g~(e) with h~, replaced by zero.
Multiplying by the probability that n job offera arrive and summing over all possible n,
including n- 0, gives the likelihood contribution of a non-workingindividual, eonditional
on e:
1(h - O~e) - exp{-a[1 -- P(O~e)]} (2.20)
To remove the conditioning on the random preference parameter in the likelihood
c:untribution has to be integrated over all e, -oo G c G oo. For the working individuals
the likelihood contribution is zero if u(h~„w,h~, ~ p) C uo and therefore the effective
integration region becomes
B :- {e~uo C u(hi„w,hr, -}, p)} (2.21)
'fhe final likelihood contribution for an individual with a job becomes
!(w., hi,) - f l(w„ h~, ~e) 1~(e) de, l, E {l, ..., m},0 G w C oo (2.22)
e o~ Q~
whr,ro ~(.) is thc standard normal density funct.ion. Note that the rangc of ra is (O,oo)
aftcr óaviug integrated out e as the region Fl is nonempty for every positive wage rate,
i.e. thcrc always exists a range of random preferences such that working is preferred over
nuu wurking fur ~w~,ry puvil.ivo wago ratr~.
1'or the non-working individuals the likelihood contribution becomes
1(h - 0) - Iexp{-a[1 - P(O~e)]} 1~~e~ de (2.23)
v~ `v~
Ií the tax system is introduced the procedure remains basically the same. The prob-
abilities in (2.12) have to be adapted and split up in accordance with the brackets in the
tax system.
3 Estimation results
The model is estimated using a sample of 849 married women in theyear 1985,
obtained frorn the Organization for Strategic Labounnarket Research (OSA). In order
to estimatP the model the m hours categories of the hours offer distribution have to
be chosen. To specify the discrete hours offer distribution, the hours are grouped into
categories each of which contain four houra levels. As a consequence, the discrete hours
distribution becomes
P(h - h~) - p~ with h~ - 4 x 1,1- 1, ..., m (3.1)
In order to be able to identify all the probabilities, some equality restrictions are placed
ou prubabilities of hours categories which have a low sample frequency. These reatrictions
arc
Pr - Ps - Pa - Pa
ps - P~r (3.2)
Pra - Pi3 - Pi~ - Pra7
The value of nx is chosen to be 15 in which case the maximum number of hours with
a positive probability is 60, which coincides with the largest nurnber of hours observed
in tlxe aample. The vector of individual characteristics X which appears in the utility
functia~ ('l.8) consists of a constant (X~ with parameter 6~ ), the logarithm of the family
size (X~ with parameter b2) and a dummy indicator for the number of children with
age below 6(X3 with parameter 63). The lattet two are characteristics of which it ís
reasonablo to assume that they affect the participation decision through the, preferences,
i.e. they a(fecL the reservation utility level. The vector of characteristics a in the wage
offer distribution consists of age variables to approximate the age-earnings profile and
of education dummies as an approximation for human capital. To be more precise, xl
is the conatant term with parameter rlr, x2 and x3 are the logarithm of age~17 and ita
square, respectively, with paremeters riz and p3, where the division by 17 is just a matter
of normalisation, and x4, xs, xei x7 with parameters rl4 - nr are education dummies, with
x~ the lowest level of education, xs is the next to the lowest level etc.
As a point of departure the model is eatimated with a linear budget constraint,
whereas the parameter a, representing the average number of job offets according to
the Poisson distribution, does not depend on individual characteristics, which is also
the case in the studies by Tummers and Woittiez (1991) and Van Soest, Woittiez and
[Capteyn (1990). Table 3.1 shows the e.stimation resulta as well as estimatea of the stan-
dard errors. The parameter estimates oí log-family size and the number of children with
age below six, b~ and ê3 respectively, have a strong positive effect on the reservation
utility level. Rather high seems to be the estimate a- 36.7 of the Poisson diatribution,
indicating that the índividuals in the sample are not that restricted. To compare, in
'Pummers and Woittiez (1991) the fixed maximum number ofjob offers in their binomial
distribution was set equal to 10. The estimate has a sizeable standard error, however.
From the estimates of the hours offer probabilities it can be seen that there are peaks
at the numbets of hours of 20, 32 and 40, which can also be found back in the empirica]
distribution of labour supply. The age-earnings profile takes on its maximum value at
thc age of 33.
Ilaving obtaincd parameter estimatea it is possible to simulate the distribution ot
hours. The simulated hours frequencies can be compared with the observed hours fre-
quencies. For each individual, a random preference parameter e and a number of job
offers n is drawn form their assumed distributions. Then n wage-hours pairs are drawn,
the utility levels are calculated and the highest utility level is compared witó the utility
of non-workïng to make the participation decision. This procedure is repeated 10 titnes
and the resulting frequencies can be found in table 3.2. The second column in table 3.2
shows the observed frequencies and the third column ahows the simulated frequenciea.
The participation decision is predicted well and the peaks at 20, 32 and 40 hours a week
arc prodict.cil by lhi~ niodcl.
Civen the values of tl~e parameter estimates it is possible to simulate the desired
number of working hours, i.e. the number of working hours the individual would have
chosen if she were not restricted in hours, which is the tangency point of the indifference
curve and the budget constraint. Then we can simulate the frequency distribution of
desired hours. In case of a linear budget constraint the utility maximizing number of8
houra of utility function (2.8) is h with
h - 0 if h' C 0 (3.3)
-h' ifh'~0 (3.4)
h' - ~l~ -} ryw f Xá } e (3.5)
'1'he aimulation procedure is as followa. Draw a random preference parameter e and a
numbcr ofjob offera n. As the individual is not restricted in her working hours the only
characti~ristic of a job that counts ia the wage rate. Draw n wage rates and choose the
highest. Calculate h' in (3.4) and make the participation decision according to (3.2)
and (3.3). Count the frequencies at which the hours occur. The results are in the
fourth column of table 3.2. We can see that deaired participation is aomewhat higher
than the actual participation: the frequency of obaerved participation is 0.390, whereas
the frequency of desired participation is 0.473. Thia suggests that there is involuntary
unemployment. Also, we see that the desired participation at 40 houra a week ia about
three times smaller than the actual participation at 40 hours a week. For positive houra,
the hours distributions are plotted in the figurea 3.1 and 3.2. In figure 3.1 we aee the
sample distribution and the distribution of simulated hours. In figure 3.2 the sample
diatribution can be compared with the distribution of desired hours. The distribution of
desired hours clearly does not match the sample distribution. The peaks at the values
of 20, 32 and 40 are not present in the distribution of desired houra.
So far, the parameter a of the Poisaon distribution which influences the number of
job offers received by individuals has been the same for everybody. However, there are
good reasons to asaume that the number of job offers received by the individuala may
diífers acroes individuals. Young peraona may get more job offers than older persons.
'The number of job offers may be different for workers who work in different sections of
the economy. Different levels of education imply different kinds of jobs and the hiring
procedurea for higher educated are usually not the same as those for individuals with a
low level of education. Therefore, the Poiason parameter has been made dependent on
individual charai~trrivtic~:
a; - exp(B'z;),i - 1,...,N (3.6)
The vector z; contains the individual characteristics. The characteristics which are in-
cluded are the constant term with parameter Br, an age variable with parameter B~,
dummy variablea which indicate the type of education (B3 and 6~) and the level of edu-
cation (parameters BS - Ba). Three types of education are distinguished: non-technical
and non-commercial type of education, indicated by secl in table 3.3 (parameter 83),
semi-technical and semi-commercial type of education (aec2, B~), and technical and com-
mercial type of education for which no dummy variable is included. The esimation
results are in table 3.3. Before considering the parameter estimatea, the values of the
log-likelihood [unctions of the specifications with and without a characteristic dependent
Poisson parameter are compared. The value of the likelihood ratio test statiatic to test
the nullhypothesis that a is independent of characteristics (6z - B3 -... - Ba - 0) is
83.58, which is well above the critical value at the 59ro level of 14.07.
Looking at the estimates of the utility parameters it can be seen that there are large
increases in the (absolute) values of the estimates, including that of the standard de-
viation of the random taste parameter, as compared to the estimates of the invariant9
Poisson parameter model in table 3.1. Comparing the eatimates of the parameters in B
with their standard errors we see that the age variable óas a negative and significant ef-
fect, the dummy indicators for the aemi-technical and semi-commercial type of education
are twsitive aud significant. The signs of the t~lucatiou dummy paramcters are negative
w}iich indicates highest level ofeducation has a higher Poisaon parameter than the lower
four levels of education. However, only the dummy for the aecond level is aignificant.
The distribution of hours is aimulated in order to aee how well the model tracks
the empirical distribution. The simulated frequencies are in table 3.4. The results
are comparable to those in table 3.2. In the last column of table 3.4 are the desired
fre.yuencies, i.e. the frequencie~ of the number of houra which would have been choaen
according to the estimates of the utility parameters if the individual were not restricted
in the choiceof hours. There is a large proportion of agents which is willing to work more
than 60 hours a week. This is largely the result of the large variance of the unobserved
taste parameter. Again, the houra diatributions are plotted. Figure 3.3 ahows the sample
distribution and the diatribution of aimulated houra and figure 3.4 shows the eample
distribution along with the diatribution of desired hours. The distribution of eimulated
hours matchea the sample diatribution very well. The distribution of deaired houra is
that flat that it almost appears as a atraight line in the figure.
Until now, the following conclusions can be drawn. From the significance of the
likelihood ratio test statistic it becomea clear that dependence of the distribution of
the number of job offers on individual characteristics cannot be ignored, as was done in
'1'utnmers and Woittiez (1991) and Van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1990). At the same
time, however, we see that if the parameter a ia made dependent on relevant individual
characteristics, preferencea seem to play no role anymore. The distribution of desired
hours becomFS very flat. Thia may of course be the result of the fact that demand side
restrictions play such an important role on the labour market that they fully determine
the behaviour of individuals. A different explanation for the phenomenon is that once
the Yoisson distribution has been made dependent on individual characteristics, there is
simply not enough information in the data set to trace down the underlying preference
structure. Furthermore, although it ia poasible to interprete the parameter estimates
of the characteristics in a qualitatively, it is difficult to give an interpretation to their
value. In the first model for example, the estimates of which are in table 3.1, we found an
estimate of a of about 37 which, in the context of this model and ignoring the atandard
error for the moment, would mean that each individual on average would óave obtained
37 job offers. But as the model is atatic, the interpretation of this number ia unclear as it
has no time dimension. This problem would be aolved if a dynamic model of sequential
search would be formulated, in which data on unemployment duration would provide
additional information, both to estimate and to interprete the parametera of the number
of job offer distribution and the parameters of the utility function. This approach ia
[ollowed in Blcemen (1992).
We now drop the assumption that the budget constraint is linear. A progressive tax
system causes the net wage rate and the number of hours to be negatively related in the
budget const.raint. Although a fi~lly structural treatment of a system oi labour income
taxe.~a is iu priuciplc implemcntable in thc modcl, we abstain form it here because of its
rather heavy computational burdea. Moffit (1984) proposed to formulate the wage rate10
as a second order polynomial in the number of working houra. The advantage of thia
approach, over the introduction of a fully specified tax system, is that we can actually
test for the dependence of net wages on the number of working hours.
'I'hc wage equation is extendcd by introducing hours.
lnw-q'x~rlhtrzh~fv (3.7)
whcre w is the net wage rate, x is a vector of individual characteristim and v is again
a normally diatributed random variable. The wage equation in (2.3) has been extended
with a term which is linear in the number of working hours and a term which is quadratic
in the number of working houra.
There is another reason why wagea may depend on hours which is interesting to
mention in this context. At institutionally determined numbers of hours like 20, 32 and
40, the offered wages may be higher for given individual characteristics and therefore
hours restríctions need not be the only explanation for observing peak leveLg. To capture
this possible relation between wages and hours in the model, dummy variables could be
taken up in the wage equation. However, inspection of the data led us to abstain from
it because no such relation appears to be present. Therefore, we shall assume from now
on that the hours terms in the wage equation represent the tax system. The gross wage
ratc, w~, is given by
wc - eXP(n~x t v) (3.8)
and the relation between the gross and the net wage rate is
w - (1 - r(h))wc (3.9)
where r(h) is the marginal tax rate which should be between zero and one and which is
non-increasing in h for a given wage rate if the tax system is progressive. From (3.6),
(3.7) and (3.8) we derive:
0 G r(h) G 1 if r~h -~ r~h~ G 0 (3.10)
r'(h) G 0 if r~ f 2rzh G 0 (3.11)
From the parameter estimates it can be checked whether these conditions are satisfied,
i.e. it can be checked whether our assumption that Lhe hours terms in the wage equation
mainly reprc4ent the tax system is fulfilled.
'1'he parameter estimates are given in table 3.5. If the estimates of the utility pararn-
eters are compared with the estimates of the basic model in table 3.1, it can be noticed
Ltiat in the present model pre[erences play a more pronounced role. The estimate of
the standard deviation of the random preference parameter has decreased substantially.
The parameter estimate of the number of job offers is also reduced. There is a atriking
difference in the estimates of the hours offer probabilities, especially of those for the
hours categories above 40 houra a week. In the basic model, there was a close relation
between the observed frequencies of hours and these probabilities. The explanation for
the low frequency of hours above 40 was that these values of hours are hardly offered. In
table 3.5 it can be seen that accordíng to the present model the probability of receiving
hours Ievcls of 44 or 6igher is not that low at all. However, the marginal increase in11
income as a result of working an additional hour is apparently that low as compared to
the effect on the marginal utility of leisure that the individuals are in general not willing
to supply thesc high hours levels.
Looking at the estimates of rl and rz it can be observed that rr is positive but
insignificant and that r7 is aignificantly negative. Checking relations (3.9) and (3.10) it
follows that (3.9) is satisfied if h, 5.7 and relation (3.10) ia satiafied for h 1 2.9. This,
together with the insignificance of r~, is in accordance witó our interpretation of the
hours terms.
Tbe likelihood ratio test atatistic to test the hypotheais rr - r~ - 0 has the value
16.596. The critical value at the 5~a leve) ia 5.991, which meana that the hypothesis is
rejected.
The simulation results in table 3.2, 3.4 and 3.6 and the graphs in the figurea 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3 provide an informal way of testing the model. To formalize the teating of the
model the chi-square test atatistic of Andrews (1988) can be calculated. As the sim of
the testing procedure is to test the predictive power of the model, only the valuea of the
endogenoua hours variable are categorized into cella. Andrews' teat statiatic is calculated
uaing three different partitiona of the hours variable. Partition 1 ia the most refined and
coincides with the catogorisation of the hours in the simulation studies in tables 3.2,
3.4 and 3.6. In partition 2 the values of the hours have been classified according to the
restrictions which have been ímposed on the probabilities of the hours offer distribution.
Partition 3 classifies hours in only two different groupa i.e. positive and non-positive
houra. The test statistic calculated with partition 3 can be used to test the predictive
power of the rnodel with respect to the participation decision. The valuea of the test
statistic are in table 3.7. It is clear that all of the three model specifications are rejected
by the three test atatistics.
Estimationexperiment with both an hours dependent wageequation and an individual
specific Poisson parameter gave similar results as the resulta in table 3.3, i.e. a flat utility
function.12
4 Conclusions
In this paper a static model of labour aupply with job offer reatrictions has been
formulated. A job, as it ia offered by an employer to an individual, conaiats of both an
hours component and a wage component, thereby linking the atandard job search model
with the static model of labour supply with hours restrictions. Because of the etructure
of Lhe model, the parameters of the wage distribution and the hours distribution have
been estimated simultaneously. The numberofjob offera has been assumed to be Poisaon
distributed and the parameter of the Poisson distribution has been made dependent on
relevant individual characteristics to examine their effect on the average number of job
offera. The results of the likelihood ratio test indicate the significance of the aet of
inclividual characteristics in the Poisson distribution. The result of the introduction of
the individual characteristics in the Poisaon diatribution is that the parameters of the
underlying utility specification cannot be traced down anymore. That is, the utility
function becornes a flat and approximately uniform random function. Thia auggesta
that the available data provide too little information to obtain sensible eatimatea of the
utility parametera. Although the simulated hours distribution in thia type of model fits
the labour supply data better than in the neoclassical model, as argued in Van Soest,
Woittier and [;apteyn (1990), this is mainly the result of the discrete specification of the
houra offer distribution.
We have pleaded for the introduction of a time dimenaion into the model by formulat-
ing a sequential job search model in which duration data provide additional information
in the estimation and interpretation of the model parametera. This idea is worked out
in I3loemen (1992).
Estimation results of a model specification in which the wage equation contains the
numberof weekly workinghours indicate the significance of the preaenceof working hours
in the equation. Moreover, the estimation results are consistent with the interpretation
that working hours arise in the wage equation as a result of the tax system. The eatimates
oí this specification auggest that the fact that empirical frequencies oí weekly working
hours above 40 are low, is not mainly the result of low offer probabilities, as was the case
in previous specificationa, but is the consequence of a low marginal increase in income of
working an additional hour as compared to the marginal utility of leisure at high hours
levels.
Sirnulation experiments in which the simulated hours distribution, as generated by the
model, was compared to the empirical hours distribution show that the model predicts
participation and various peaks in the hours distribution well. However, a formal teating
proccdurr mjc~ts the hypothesis Lhat the simulated data and thc observed data have the
same distribution.13
TABI.E 3.1 PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Parameters F.stimatea Standard errors
~ -0.0287 0.00688
7 6.473 1.605
6, (const) 18.936 9.561
óz (log fs) -56.289 10.447




q, (const) 1.445 0.290
~z (log(age~17)) 1.3G8 0.236
p~ (log(age~17))~ -1.019 0.169
i~~ (cducl) -0.484 O.Ofi99
r~s (educ`l) -0.451 0.0685
pe (educ3) -0.378 0.0624
rlr (educ4) -0.116 0.0678
pl - p~ - ps - p~ 0.0743 0.00950
ps 0.137 0.0202



























TABLE 3.2 SIb1ULATED HOURS FREQUENCIES
hours Empirical Simulated Deroired
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TABLE 3.3 PARAMETER ESTIMATES WITH VARIATION IN J1
Parameters Estimates Standard errors
Q -0.163 0.319
y 22.613 47.508
6i (conat) 409.473 739.121
6~ (log fs) -421.260 820.003
ê3 (~ childCó) -264.451 523.084
o~ 248.687 484.629
Bi (const) 3.759 0.545
Bz (log(age~17)) -3.378 0.317
B3 (secl) 1.417 1.427
B4 (sec2) 0.397 0.165
BS (educ 1) -0.568 0.525
BB (educ'l) -0.970 0.515
9~ (educ3) -0.445 0.483
Bs (educ4) -0.119 0.506
o„ 0.265 0.00113
q~ (const) 1.857 0.119
r12 (log(age~l7)) 1.912 0.259
q3 (log(age~17)~ - 1.060 0.197
p~ (educl) -0.397 0.0889
r~s (cduc2) -0.288 0.0839
t~e (cduc3) -0.279 0.0764
q~ (educ4) -0.0962 0.0824
Pi - Ps - 1~ - P~ 0.117 0.0120
ps 0.162 0.0244





p„ - pi3 - p~~ - pi5 0.00194 0.000802
Log-likelihood value: -1960.6767I6
TABLE 3.4 SIh1 ULATED HOURS FREQUENCIES
houra Empirical Simulated Desired
írequenciea frequaiciea fcequenciee
0(i.e. non-working) 0.610 0.603 0.484
4 0.0153 0.0177 0.00441
8 0.0318 0.0216 0.00443
12 0.0236 0.0260 0.00434
16 0.0259 0.0315 0.00432
'l0 0.0518 0.0529 0.00427
24 0.0318 0.0188 0.00437
28 0.00942 0.0228 0.00412
32 0.0495 0.0509 0.00439
36 0.0259 0.0272 0.00451
40 0.101 0.104 0.00426
44 0.0141 0.0144 0.00432
48 0.00353 0.00206 0.00432
52 0.00471 0.00221 0.00438
56 0.000 0.00241 0.00441
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TABLE 3.5 PARAMETER ESTIMATES,












































































Pis - Pi3 - Pi~ - Pis 0.107 0.0451
Log-likelihood value: -1985.873518
TABLE 3.6 SIMULATED HOURS FREQUENCIES,
IIOURS DEPENDENT WAGES
- hours Empirical Simulated Desired
írequencies frequencies frequencies
0(i.e. non-working) 0.610 0.600 0.137
4 0.0153 0.0251 0.0382
8 0.0318 0.0257 0.0498
12 0.0236 0.0250 0.0627
16 0.0259 0.0227 0.0860
20 0.0518 0.0537 0.102
24 0.0318 0.0247 0.107
28 0.00942 0.0183 0.113
32 0.0495 0.0514 0.102
36 ' 0.0259 0.0269 0.0999
40 0.101 0.103 0.0729
44 0.0141 0.00142 0.0219
98 0.00353 0.00640 0.00612
52 0.00471 0.00199 0.00188
56 0.000 0.000599 0.000234
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1'A[3LE 3.7 ANDREWS' CHI-SQUARE TEST STATIST[C
chi-square statistic partition 1 partition 2 partition 3
fixed a model 395.460 47.466 33.534
variablr' a nrodcl '169.233 39.481 19.062
hours dependenl. wages 216.504 49.494 34.337
i~ritir-al valu~.
at 50l0 level 24.996 15.507 3.84120
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